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Survivorship in international
chain restaurants in Korea
by Woo Gon Kim
and Kaye Chon

Several western chains have done well fn
Korea, while others have withdrawn from
the market. The authors summarize the
current operational resub of western
cha;n restaurants in Korea, report positive
impacts of western foodservice ffms, and
analyze the key elements leading to their
survival and non-survival. Some lessons
could be used as tools to establish
entrance strategies of western chain
restaurants in Korea as well as in other
Asian markets.

T

he food service industry in
Korea has grown considerably in size and changed
significantly in composition over
the last several decades. Within
a decade the number of restaurants increased more than three
times, compared to the figure of
154,000 units in 1988. Many of
them are family-owned and are
small conlmercial restaurants.
Food away from home
(FAFH) expenditures per household in 1990 represented 21.6
percent of total food spending
expenditures, while that figure
22

in Japan was approximately 25
percent in the same period. In
the U S . , FAFH expenditures per
household in 1996 were approximately 45 percent compared to
35 percent in Korea.'
Western chains enter

It was not until the 1980s
that Korean food service became
a modern enterprise with strong
management emphasis. In 1982
Burger King signed a franchise
contract and started operations
in Korea. In the following two to
seven years, American chain
restaurants such as Wendy's and
Kentucky Fried Chicken (KFC),
both in 1984, Pizza Hut in 1985,
McDonald's in 1986, Denny's in
1987, Coco's in 1988, and
Domino's Pizza in 1990 penetrated the Korean food service
market.
In the 1990s, the Korean food
service firms that made joint
ventures or franchising agreements with western food service
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firms shifted from their previous
concentration on fast-food operations toward more diverse
concepts such as family restaurants and dinner houses. Some
of those restaurants are TGI
Friday's that arrived in 1991,
Ponderosa in 1992, Sizzler in
1993, Popeye's in 1994, Tony
Roma's, Bennigan's, and Planet
Hollywood in 1995, Chili's and
Hard Rock Cafe in 1996,
Outback Steakhouse in 1997,
and Starbucks in 1999. By
providing casual and friendly
service and a nice atmosphere
not usually found in Korea,
western restaurants became the
food service equivalent of Levi's
Jeans or Coca-Cola.2
Chains are varied

There were also some
successful chains that are nonwestern restaurants. Lotteria, a
Japanese hamburger restaurant
chain, was the first chain restaurant company introduced to Korea
in 1979; its performance is ranked
at the top of the fast-food segment
in terms of the number of units and
sales. Skylark, a successhl family
reskaurant in Japan introduced in
1993, emphasized a lower-end
market positioning strategy by
maintaining a lower average check
of US$10. The average check of
most western family restaurants in
Korea ranged from US$13 to
US$18. Marche, introduced in
1997 fro111 Switzerland, became a
strong competitor against the
rapidly expanding American food
service chains.

Table 1 summarizes the
status of American food semice
chains operating in Korea a t the
end of 2000. Of the top 25 restaurant chains ranked by Nation's
Restaurant hrews in terms of U.S.
sales, only 10 were represented in
K ~ r e a .Baskin-Robbins
~
had the
largest number of units in Korea,
but most were very small. In
terms of the number of units,
McDonald's with 244 units was
the second largest U.S. chain in
Korea, followed by KFC and Pizza
Hut, with 206 and 199 units,
respectively.
Within the segment of family
and dinner house, Coco's with
29 units was the leading
restaurant, followed by TGI
Friday's and Bennigan's with 17
units and 10 units, respectively.
In terms of sales volume,
McDonald's was the number one
chain with US$206.4 million,
followed by Pizza Hut and
Kentucky Fried Chicken with
US$156.3 and US$145.3 million,
respectively. Among family and
dinner house restaurants, TGI
Friday's was the leading chain
with US$46.9 million, followed
by Bennigan's and Coco's with
US$31.5 million and US$23.4
million, respectively
It is interesting to note that
Coco's, which commands a
relatively tiny market share in
the U.S. restaurant industry
and which falls behind TGI
Friday's and Outback Steakhouse in terms of the number of
units operating in the U.S. was
ranked as one of the top 10
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U.S. chain restaurants penetrated the Korean food service
industry. Sizzler, Ponderosa, and
Chili's operated only a few units
in Korea in 2000.

chains in Korea. In fact, Coco's,
the first U.S. family restaurant
to open in Korea in 1988,enjoyed
the leadership position before
other well-known, high-profile

Table 1
U.S.-based food service chain
restaurants in Korea in 2000
Brand

Rank in
number
of units
Korea

Number
ol units
in Korea

Korean
sales volume
(US $Millions)

U.S.
units
rank

U.S.
units
number

U.S.
sales
rank

U.S. sales
volume
(USSMiI)

McDonald3

2

244

$206 4

2

Burger King

8

93

67.3

4

12.629

1

$19,006

8.139

2

8.659

Hardeep

10

23

15.6

KFC

3

206

145.3

16

2.673

13

2,139

8

5.182

6

4.300

Popeye's

6

160

108.6

32

1.165

35

986.4

Pina Hut

5

199

156.3

5

8,084

5

5,000

Domino's Pina

7

149

39.1

11

4.629

9

2,560

Little Caesars Pina

14

6

NA

12

3.850

26

1.200

Coco's

9

29

23.4

88

NA

NA

NA

Ponderosa

17

3

NA

56

465

58

560.2

Siuler

15

4

6.3

76

253

90

315

Tony Roma's
15
-

4

9.0

85

157

100

297

Benn~gan's

12

10

31 5

79

237

71

460.3

Chili's

18

2

NA

43

626

21

1.555

Piueria Uno Chicago 18

2

NA

86

155

94

308.4

OulbackSteakhouse 13

8

11.7

47

574

18

1.729

TGI Friday's

11

17

46.9

58

452

24

1,334

Dunktn Donuts

4

200

19.5

13

3.650

15

2.007

Baskin-Robbins

1

460

29.7

18

2,438

57

573.3

Source of units and sales in Korea: Korean Restaurant Associaton. 2000
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Managers of the three different
segments of Korcan restaurants,
traditional Korean food, fast food,
and family and dinner house, were
selected for an interview. The 12
restaurants included one traditional Korcan food restaurant, two
hamburger fast food restaurants,
two pizza restaurants, two chicken
restaurants, and five family and
dinner house restaurants. The
majority were western chain
restaurants.
Positive impact recognized
Managers participating in the
focus group interview recognized
the following positive impacts of
western food senrice firms on the
Korean food service industry:
Enriching dining out: The
entrance of western restaurants
enabled local diners toget new exposure to diverse choices in dining-out
experiences,while encouraging local
restaurant managers to benchmark
from western restaurants. Many
Korean restaurant managers recognized that they were not able to
compete with their traditional
management style. They thought
that food taste and quality were the
keys for success, but they underestimated other important factors such
as atmosphere, interior design,
service, cleanliness, etc. They eventually recognized that restaurants
existed to cater not only to hungry
people, but for social activity
purposes as well.
Stimulating growth: The
average square footage of restaurants tended to increase. Many

mom-and-pop establishments
found they could not compete
effectively against a huge local
restaurant, international chain,
or domestic chain restaurant.
Regardless of the rapid increase
in the number of stand-alone
restaurants, the proportion of
restaurants
whose
owners
directly participated in management decreased from 22.3
percent in 1982 to 12.9 percent in
1 9 9 1 . T h i s fact reflects that
many small eating places had
become large local restaurants
affiliated with prominent local
restaurant chains.
Some larger corporations
entered the food service industry
as a diversification strategy
by becoming master franchisers
of mostly western restaurant
companies. The conglomerate's
motivation to participate in the
food service industry with multiple
brands was the positive cash flow
created by restaurant operations
and real estate investments.
Wealthy individuals, conglomerates, and institutions tend
to invest in land to benefit from
the appreciation of real estate,
while they have to pay large
amounts of tax for unused land.
By building restaurants on the
vacant land, landowners were
able to take advantage of both
the constant cash flow and
significantly reduce their tax
burdens.
The three typical firms participating in the food service iddustry
were food-related companies, retail
companies, and hotels. Food produc-
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tion, manufacturing, and supplier
firms already had some business
relationships with the food service
industry; therefore, it was relatively easy to establish new finns.
Hotels had the expertise in operating upscale food and beverage
outlets; it was therefore a natural
strategy for them to expand by
establishing free-standing restaurants outside the hotels.
Effective management:

When western food service firms
entered the Korean market, they
were initially perceived as a
threat to traditional Korean
restaurant operators. Korean
food service enterprises learned
western ways of efficiently operating restaurants. Franchising
played an important role in
seeking replications of advanced
management techniques and
strategies. Management innovation became an important ingredient for successful restaurant
operations even though Korean
food service managers traditionally did not place much emphasis
on it.
Included among the most
successful local chain restaurants
was Nolbu Korean traditional
restaurant. Its history started
with a small Korean restaurant
selling boiled pork in 1987, and
within two years it launched
its first franchise operation.
Currently Nolbu operates and
franchises more than six different
concept restaurants featuring
traditional Korean cuisine.
Menus consist of purely tradi-

tional Korean fare that is rooted
in traditional home-style recipes.
Nolbu Korean restaurant's
success is attributed to the application of western scientific
management techniques into
Korean traditional food operations. Its expansion in terms of
the number of franchised units
and sales has skyrocketed. Since
Nolbu is not competing against
many western chain restaurants,
its market position among Korean
restaurants is superior.
Manuals and technology:

Traditional Korean food service
operators were astonished by the
introduction of manuals that clearly
explained the overall operational
processes! Stimulated by international chain restaurants' sophisticated
operating
manuals,
traditional Korean restaurants
started developing their own. In
addition, many Korean conglomerates entered the food service
industry with franchise contracts
with famous western restaurants
because they considered food service
as a profitable business. In order to
survive the competition of famous
western restaurants, many local
restaurants developed their own
brands and expanded with local
franchising. Technological advances
of western restaurants have led to
sophisticated business controls and
established franchise systems. In
addition, well-organized manuals of
employee training, food production,
menu design and layout, and store
opening were important lessons for
local operators.
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New market niche: Since
western food service chains introduced the take-out concept, the
take-out business became more
popular and a variety of foods were
developed for take-out. Traditionally, Chinese restaurants used to be
the provider of most popular takeout or delivery food in Korea, but
fast-food restaurants serving pizza,
chicken, and hamburgers expanded
rapidly by offering take-out or
dclivery services. In addition,
diverse local cuisines such as
Kimbap, a kind of California roll,
and a variety of noodle dishes were
developed and served more often by
take-out
Reduced labor costs: Traditionally small eating places were
considered as one of the least
popular places to work. The
restaurant industry was often
perceived as a gateway for
unskilled workers; as a result, the
employee turnover rate in the
food service industry was known
to be one of the highest. However,
this trend was reversed when
western food service operators
started offering effective training
programs, with trainees exposed
to various functions related to the
management of operations, sanitation, service, human resources,
basic equipment maintenance
and
operations,
restaurant
cashing out, and record-keeping.
The adoption of these ongoing
employee training programs
aided in reducing the high
turnover rate.
A dramatic
increase in the percentage of parttime employees reduced labor

costs and improved the bottom
line figure.
Survivor cases presented
Despite the diaculty of identifylng primary reasons of success,
some key factors of survival of
western and local chain restaurants could be identified by restaurant managers.
Localization of services:
TGIF translated more than 100

operating and training manuals
into Korean to take full advantage
of the expertise of the parent
company. TGIF succeeded in localizing its service standards by
adjusting to local customs and
culture.
For example, TGIF
crcoted a new ordering method,
"kneel-down" service, rather than
the traditional western stand-up
ordering method. TGIF developed
many local menu items to appeal
to Korean guests. Kimchi rice
pilaf, the Bulgogi set menu, and
Bibimpap (a dish with rice and
several vegetables) are the most
popular items developed by TGIF
in Korea and sold throughout TGIF
outlets in other countries. The
success of Marche, introduced from
Switzerland, could be partly
attributed to the effort of catering
to local taste preferences.
Marche has been very flexible in
developing and changing its original recipe in order to improve
guest satisfaction.
A success case as a local
brand was Spaghettia, an Italianstyle restaurant. Its primary
reason for success was the trade
secret of its recipes that changed
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original Italian flavors with some
major adaptations, including
developing its thin sauce and
serving larger portions of sauces
to cater to local preferences. In
addition, Spaghettia consistently
used the best quality ingredients
regardless of the relatively high
food cost ratio.
BBQ Chicken, Inc. originated
from a fast food concept that
specializes in providing quick,
convenient, varied chicken entrees
such as fried, hot wing, barbecued,
smoked, Cajun-style, nuggets, gold
fingers, burgers, and side dishes.
The BBQ name does not represent
the traditional western-style
barbeque restaurant theme, but
more of a combination of several
western style operations such as
KFC, Popeye's, and others. BBQ
achieved enormous growth since
1994 and became the leading
Korean chain restaurant in the
number of units offering fast food
chicken items. Its success was
mainly attributed to the development of its appealing spicy hot
sauce which met the taste preferences of local guests, thereby
attracting repeat customers.

-

Cost controls: With the

completion of a central kitchen in
1992, TGIF reduced food costs from
40 to 30 percent. Marketing activities such as sending birthday cards,
using coupons, and issuing mileage
and point cards were very
successful. Nolbu Korean restaurant is a typical example of success
by adopting an American management technique, which led to a

28

dramatic food cost reduction. Nolbu
was able to reduce food costs from 30
percent to 20 percent by developing
a database of recipes of Korean
cuisines. Previously, local restaurateurs adopted best practices from
the excellent western operational
systems.
Product and service quality:

Mister Pizza, a typical success
story of a local chain with sales of
US$13 million in 2000, has built a
good reputation based on its tasty
pizza. By implementing an extensive research and development
program to better serve the local
taste, Mister Pizza succeeded in
developing hand-toasted dough,
which was less greasy and tasted
fresher. The chain also introduced
a new potato pizza menu that
became a popular item, and was
later imitated by Pizza Hut and
other competitors.
All foods of March6 are selected
and produced in front of guests so
most employees have cooking skills
as well as the ability to function as
wait staff. The primary goal of
Marche is to serve fresh food and to
have a consistent supply of fresh
food items. The atmosphere is very
casual with old market styie; a
variety of people like the open atmosphere. Marche offers a wide variety
of items including fresh salad and
baked goods, as well as Japanese,
Chinese, Korean, and other ethnic
foods. March6 is well known for
keeping the menu lifecycle as short
as possible and taking advantage of
a wide variety of menus as compared
to other western family chains.
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Finding good locations:
Slarbucks' success was attributed to
its strategies in locations, capitalizing on locations with high traffic
flow and easy access fmm mass
transportation such as subway and
bus, which appealed to younger
customers. A similar strategy
worked well for other chains.
The BBQ chain was known to
be good at finding the right locations and utilizing a unique positioning strategy. BBQ opened
many small units in residential
areas and others were located close
to educational institutes, while
Kentucky Fried Chicken (KFC)
opened spacious units in relatively
established locations with a high
volume of traffic. RBQ expanded
very rapidly in t e r n of number of
units, but the average size of the
unit was very small compared to its
major competitor, Kentucky Fried
Chicken. In 2000 BBQ operated
1,320 units while Kentucky Fried
Chicken had 206 units.
Effective
investment
strategy: The success of Spaghettia
was partly attributed toits relatively
efficient investment strategy. In
order to minimize costs, most units
chose basement locations with
savings of almost half the rental
costs, while most other family chains
were located on the first or second
floor. Spaghettia offset its location
disadvantages with
massive
marketing and promotion efforts.
Non-survivor cases presented
Managers identified some key
factors for t,he failure of western
restaurant chains.
Kirn and Chon

High pricing strategy:
Denny's concept adjustment efforts
with a high pricing strategy
conflicted with its original American
concept. Many local guests had
dined at 1J.S. outlets and their
perception of reasonable prices did
not match the h g h pricing strategy
in Korea. Denny's price positioning
in Korea was close to the range of
other U.S. family and dinner house
chains. Many clients preferred to go
to other restaurants aRer their first
visit to Denny's in Korea because its
price-value relationship was much
lower than what they expe~ted.~
Poor management: Wait
staffs service and cooking skills in
the production area were not up to
par partly due to lack of a consistent
employee training program by
Denny's. Employee morale was
quite low due to ineffective compensation and a promotion policy that
was based on seniority. The capabilities of management staff were
not suficient enough to compete
against other major U.S. chain
restaurants in K0rea.l
Poor marketing strategy:
Denny's marketing effort was not
creative and oRen imitated other
competitors. The special events
Denny's prepared were not popular
due to lack of creativity. Failure of
its promotional effort was partially
due to the lack of harmony between
employees in the marketing department and each outlet's guest
contact employees.
Poor location: When
Planet Hollywood was first introduced in Korea, it had the mass
media spotlight even before
29
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opening with large crowds gathering for the ceremony. An inappropriate location without a
subway line and with heavy traffic
congestion was key in the failure of
Planet Hollywood. This was a good
example for US.-based chains to
learn from since it withdrew from
business within seven months.
Many guests visiting Planet Hollywood complained about insufficient
parking spaces which inconvenienced guests and prevented
many from becoming repeat
customers.
Lack of thorough feasibility study: Excessive capital

expenditures without a thorough
feasibility study implied the foreseeable failure of Planet Hollywood
in Korea. Its initial investment was
approximately US$7 to 8 million.
In order to attain break-even sales,
daily revenue should have been at
least US$50,000 or the equivalent
to 10 turnovers. Extremely heavy
initial opening costs and normal
operating costs caused the high
break-even point.
Failure of cost control:

Planet Hollywood management
failed to control labor costs at the
outset. The restaurant opened with
approximately 300 full-time
employees, and labor productivity
declined as customer counts
decreased. It failed because of inadequate cost controls and lowerthan-expected sales.
Failure to adjust to local
taste: Cooks in the production area

failed to adjust to local tastes
because most food recipes were
benchmarked from the Planet
30

Hollywood in Hong Kong. Korean
customers have very different food
tastes from those of Hong Kong
even though they are located in the
same Pacific Rim area. Most foods
were too salty and contained too
much oil for local taste preferences,
but management did not catch the
problem in a timely manner.
Competition exists

The Korean food service
industry showed dramatic growth
over the last several decades. Up
to 1996 all segments of the food
service industry grew because of
the significant increase of foodaway-from-home expenditures,
increased incomes, and people's
increased interest in food. In the
1980s western fast food chains
were forerunners in launching
brands in Korea, and in the 1990s
many western family steakhouse
and dinner house restaurant
chains entered the market.
Western
restaurant
chains
provided clean facilities, quality
services, great atmospheres, and
systematic management that was
astonishing to local customers who
had never experienced them
before. Beginning in 1998 the
Korean economy went through an
economic recession and the food
service industry faced stiff competition. Some segments still show
strong growth, but some exhibit a
decline.
Even though the overall food
service market is more competitive than ever before, there is still
enough room for new chains to
introduce concepts. Since most
FZU Hospitality Reuieur /Spring 2003
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western restaurants were fast food
or dinner house chains, new
concept restaurants such as theme
restaurants are expected to have
great appeal if introduced. Many
other top American chains such as
Applebee's, Olive Garden, Red
Lobster, and International House
of Pancake (IHOP) have not yet
been introduced. The reason may
be that some of those chains still
have ample growth opportunities
in the United States, giving them
little motivation to expand into
Korea. In addition, since they are
very successful chains, their
royalty fee structure may be too
high for local partners. However,
American chain restaurants may
still have more expansion opportunities in Asia. Coco's and Tony
Roma's found new life in Asia
when the brand's popularity began
to decline in the United States.
A number of premier U.S.
chains keep dominating market
share, while others are not market
leaders; some chains have withdrawn from the market entirely
The key elements of survivors were
localization of services and operations, effective management,
leading to cost control, product and
service quality, good locations, and
an eflective investment strategy.
The key elements of non-survivors
were inappropriate concept modifi-
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cation with a high pricing strategy,
poor management and lack of
consistent employee training, poor
marketing strategy, poor location,
lack of thorough feasibility study,
failure of cost control, and failure
to adjust local taste.
Understanding the key nonsurvival elements could help
western food service finns reduce
their chances of business failure
during their expansion movement in
Korea as well as in other Asian
markets. Even in the same Pacific
Rim regions, for example, some
chains succeeded in Hong Kong and
Singapore, but could not succeed in
Japan and Korea. It is important for
western restaurant chains to do a
more in-depth analysis of each
country, even within the same
geographic regions. A more comprehensive understanding of unique
cultures, food habits, and local
tastes of each country will be helpful
for western chains to successfully
expand into Asia. Another important factor for Korea and other
Asian markets is the extent to which
newcomers can or should m o w
original concepts and recipes to
meet local needs and tastes!
Reviewing more accurate and
comprehensive success and failure
cases could be invaluable resources
for those restaurant finns planning
to expand into foreign countries.
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